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Peter Roberts

This Means War

Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) has matured considerably since the early 2000s. More data sources, better data bases, lower costs, increasing automation and processing all provide a wealth of data for analysts to get hold of. But exploiting all those sources requires a skilled team of tenacious people to provide the answers that are being sought, but also in checking that the veracity of the data. Peter talks to James Byrne, Director of the Open Source Intelligence and Analysis (OSIA) Research Group about constructing teams for OSINT work, the technicalities of OSINT, dealing with data overload, spoofing and fooling OSINT systems, and the future of Open Source Intelligence.

Working the OSINT opportunity

National security risk registers capture a large number of potential threats to societies. So should any review of national security or national defence. The impacts of these risks are often more severe than predicted, and we are due a few more (according to pattern analysis over the history of the planet). Professor Peter Frankopan, global best-selling author and world renowned historian, talks through some of the big issues that should be on the agenda of any threat-based national security review including food, health, fuel, water, and raw materials.
 
The UK has a sound record of identifying these threats - even if successsive governments are poor at preparing for them. It is somewhat puzzling that any review of national security, like the one that the UK is currently undertaking, should be focused solely on military, geopolitical and technology risks and not those that might prove a much greater challenge to the safety and security of the state.

The Threat Landscape with Peter Frankopan

Successive reports from the UK parliament since 2022 have highlight the inadequacies of air and missile defences in the UK against a growing threat envelope. Like many European states, missile defence – from UAVs, conventional, ballistic or hypersonic missiles – has been an area that successive governments have underinvested in. Events in Ukraine, Syria, Yemen and Israel make those points with rather startling clarity. Part of the remit that the UK SDR has been charged with is a ‘so what’ moment on missile defence. What would good look like? What would it cost? Are we (in the UK and other European states) starting from scratch or is there an existing baseline to build on? One of the global IAMD experts and gurus in such matters is Tom Karako from CSIS in Washington DC. His pragmatism on what can be delivered, what must be defended against, and success looks like is noteworthy. As a finale, Tom offers some metrics of success of any UK announcement of a missile defence capability for the UK that is announced over the coming year.

SDR Threat series - Missile Defence (you can't defend everything)

The continual changes to British defence acquisition and procurement processes, frameworks, doctrines, strategies and plans have wreaked havoc with the military equipment plan for decades. Various – and sometimes radical – reforms have been tried to evolve a system that is ubiquitously criticised from everyone inside (and outside) the national security community. No one is happy, yet most people actually involved in it are trying very hard to make it work. This is not a uniquely British problem however: There is nowhere in the world that people are content with their procurement system - each one could be faster, buy better kit, deliver imporved value-for-money and quality, pleasing taxpayers as well as the people who use the kit. Given that the on-going UK SDR must try and come up with some recommendations to make it ‘better’ (hopefully in a different way than every other one has promised to do since 1997), what are the opportunities and risks this time around? Dr Andrew Curtis helps us think thus through with some sage advice: how about starting by implementing all the bits of some previous attempts at reform?

SDR Threat series – Buying Silver Bullets

The politics of a review of a national security strategy are huge. What is the appetite for change? What is the appetite to deliver? What is the political reference and timeframe for decisions? How to balance domestic pressures and foreign threats? Former UK Minister of the Armed Forces, military veteran, and ex-MP, The Rt Hon James Heappey talks about the tensions and challenges of putting national security on the political agenda, getting it funded, delivering change, and why it doesn’t always work as planned. A fascinating insight into how politics at this level works, with all the implications on industry, society, voter, and banking. No mincing of words here.

SDR Threat Series – The Politics of a Defence Review

If the relationship between a government, the military, and industry is to really change from a transactional one towards a sincere partnership it must be underpinned by a new era of honesty and clarity. Simon Kings, Exec BD Director of Raytheon UK, talks about what has changed for industry since 2022, and what the threat picture looks like for the DIB. The discussion covers procurement and acquisition, processes and modernisation, challenges to delivery, and what the reality of ‘sovereignty’ as a political ambition statement looks like. Foundational to all of this is Simon’s description of the way industry (and shareholders) make investment decisions: yet another set of political speeches and promises, policies and transformations, doesn’t cut it. Clarity about which bits of national security are not going to be funded are as important as the revelations of what is to be renewed. That honesty and clarity seems to have been missing for several decades. Will this be the moment it changes?

SDR Threat Series - Trust and Honesty

President Trump might have shocked some European leaders but the writing has been on the wall for decades: European states will have to take responsibility for their own security. Despite Russian aggression in Europe since Georgia (2008), and the promises made by NATO states in Wales 2014, there are only a few NATO states that can provide a degree of credible assurance on national security to their populations as the US withdraws. RUSI’s Ed Arnold delves into the implications for national and regional security for individual states and multilateral bodies: from leadership and the consequences for NATO, to EU and EC funding mechanisms. Critically, the timeline for US withdrawal and European rearmament might not align: the resulting window when Russia could unpick the credibility of NATO arrives rapidly.

SDR Threat series: National Security without US guarantees

The West has not deterred Russia from destabilising Europe, the Caucasus, North and Sub Saharan Africa, or the Middle East. Moscow has undertaken war-like activity in NATO states since the 1990s: from assassination, subterfuge and sabotage to attacks on critical national infrastructure, political interference and industrial espionage. Russian expert Keir Giles, a senior consulting fellow of the Russia and Eurasia Programme at Chatham House in London, explains what Russia wants, how the West misunderstands Russian societal desires, the Russian way of war, measures of success, and why economics and prosperity just aren’t important to them. Keir finishes with a discussion on what it takes to deter Russia: this has been done before and could be done again. It just takes political will. Whether European leaders have that is a completely different question.

SDR Threat series: How to deter Russia?

After more than 3 years of war in Ukraine, the Russian military is not a spent force: indeed, the combination of more flying hours for more aircrew, 3 years of combat experience in CAS, AI, CAP, Strike and ISR missions, a war economy supporting new airframes and weapons, and low pilot attrition rates has made the Russian Air Force capable of what it was supposed to do in 2022 – and then some. It now has the ability to outmatch European NATO states in capability, experience and fighting power for the next decade. Professor Justin Bronk, Senior Research Fellow for Air Power at RUSI in London, explains why a wholesale shift to drones isn’t going to be the ubiquitous answer that the speeches from military and political leaders make out. As the IAMD system in NATO states matures (albeit at differing speeds), the Russian system is also a major factor in air power planning for the future. The impact on how NATO wants to fight, and how it will have to fight, is stark. And it’s not going to be good enough to continue copying the US model: for the USAF and USN, the Pacific is requiring a drive towards a different force design, way of operating, C2, and basing options from those that would work for NATO in Europe. Context matters.

Air combat power vs IAMD

Given the way Russian military cheifs send their troops into combat without regard for rates of attrition and casualties, it seems to bamboozle many Western commentators that the Russian people are not rising up against their leaders. Why? Amelie Tolvin, a visiting scholar at the University of Helsinki’s Aleksanteri Institute, provides some clear insight about why revolution is unlikely, but also why Russian troops fight in the way they do (war crimes and all).
 
Over the past 3 years – since the start of Russia’s full scale invasion of Ukraine - various military leaders, diplomats, military chiefs and commentators have been at pains to tell us all that the Russian military is on the verge of collapsing. They have quoted figures of dead and injured from that conflict that seem almost impossible for a Western audience to accept. Indeed, the loss rate of people on the Russian front has been so high that people suggest there are no more men in Russian to recruit or conscript. Amelie provides some important corrective evidence that needs to be better understood.
 
You can read Amelie's article in Foreign Policy Magazine here: https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/04/09/russia-soldiers-ukraine-war-crimes-meatgrinder-human-waves-brutal-violence-protest/

The Russian Meat Grinder

Intelligence failures, strategic surprise, heavy attrition, mass casualties, reversals, internal rivalries, personality conflicts, communications breakdowns, political posturing and big egos. Plus an enemy that out-gunned, out-numbered, out-fought (at least initially) and out-flanked the IDF in ways that had been discounted for years. The 1973 Yom Kippur War (the Fourth Arab-Israeli War) was an event that shaped the Middle East for decades afterwards but also changed the Western Way of War. Peter talks to Lt Col Nate Jennings, US Army, about wide wet crossings, multi-domain operations, reconstructing divisions under fire, hubris, and how land forces can create windows for other domains to get to the fight. If only someone had explained MDO like this before.....

A Cautionary Tale from 1973

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